Where to start? Just after my last post, Lehman fell and took the rest of the market with it. I went to grad school and was working nonstop. So here we are almost a year later and it's a little like not much has changed. The S&P 500 is now at mere 30% below where its frothy levels of 2007. This is, in no small part, due to the decisive actions of Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Paulson.
We are now, as the consensus goes, somewhere between a reasonably assured bottom and an impressive 20% rally in the S&P that is getting a bit ahead of itself. My take is that we're a whole lot better off than we were 6 months ago and, frothy or not, the bounce is a decisive step in the right direction. We've come a long way.
And we have a ways to go still. Commercial real estate and credit card loans are of particular concern. But in all likelihood the financial markets are not going to fall into complete decay and a second great depression is not at hand. This is no small resolution. It could easily have happened.
Interestingly enough, I picked up some of Ben Graham's writings that he published just after the crash of 1929. He was discussing the role of insurers ("surety companies") in guaranteeing mortgage bonds. The parallels of today are eerily similar:
"During the 1924-1930 period several of the independent surety and fidelity companies extended their operations to include the guaranteeing of real-estate mortgages for a fee or premium. Theoretically, this should have represented the soundest method of conducting such operations. In addition to the strength and general experience of the surety company there was the important fact that such a guarantor, being entirely independent, would presumably be highly critical of the issues submitted for its guaranty. But this theoretical advantage was offset to a great extent by the fact that surety companies began the practice of guaranteeing real-estate-mortgage bonds only a short time prior to their debacle, and they were led by the general overoptimism then current to commit serious errors in judgment. In most cases the resultant losses to the suretor were greater than it could stand; several of the companies were forced into receivorship (notably National Surety Company), and holders of bonds with such guarantees failed to obtain full protection."Yes, AIG jumped to my mind as well. This was published in 1934. We appear to have learned little of consequence since.
It also makes me question whether these problems were actually driven primarily by the complexity of the instruments as the consensus seems to follow...